Research on the Influence of Dual Ownership Structure on Stakeholders: Based on the Case Study of “Xiaomi Group”

Jianping Sun, Zhengjun Wang, TRAN THI NGAT

Abstract


Based on the stock exchange of Hong Kong, China’s first USES the “dual share structure of listed companies (millet group) as the research object, to explore the applied double voting rights in the framework, the fight for the interests of various stakeholders, and for the future of China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange to accept dual share structure of listed companies to provide a feasibility study Angle of view, at the same time to provide this voting architecture theory research significance, relevant research literature.

Keywords


Dual voting structure; Stakeholder; Xiaomi Group

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.12346/ems.v2i4.4152

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