Can Non-controlling Large Shareholders’ Exit Threats Promote Corporate Innovation Empirical Research Based on Corporate Governance

Xiyan Bai

Abstract


Traditional research believes that the threat of non-controlling major shareholders’ withdrawal has an impor- tant impact on the effectiveness of corporate governance. However, the existing theoretical research lacks due attention to the influence mechanism contained in the above relationship, so this paper attempts to make up for this deficiency. This paper uses the data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018 to study the relationship and impact mechanism between the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders and enterprise innovation. The research finds that, first, the threat of non-controlling major shareholders’ withdrawal can significantly enhance enterprise innovation. Second- ly, from the analysis of adjustment mechanism, it is found that when more government subsidies are received, it will strengthen the positive effect of the withdrawal threat of non-controlling major shareholders and enterprise innovation. When enterprises face high industry concentration, it will weaken the positive effect of the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders and enterprise innovation. This provides evidence support for the positive impact of the non-con- trolling major shareholders’ withdrawal threat on the enterprise, thus deepening the research framework of the govern- ance effect of non-controlling major shareholders.

Keywords


Non-controlling major shareholder; Exit threat; Corporate innovation; Corporate governance

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.12346/ems.v4i2.7257

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