A Literature Review of the Research on the Influence of Equity Incentives on Enterprise Performance

Ming Yang

Abstract


At present, 746 A-share listed companies in China have implemented equity incentives. The proportion is as high as 19.69%. As far as equity incentive plans are concerned, existing research has examined the impact of equity incentive plans on the quality of internal control from multiple perspectives and supports the positive correlation between the two: on the whole, the greater the intensity of equity incentives, the greater the internal control, the higher the effectiveness. The implementation of equity incentive plans can help improve corporate performance, while internal control can inhibit the self-interested motives and risk-taking behavior of executives. The improvement of the effectiveness of internal control plays a virtuous intermediary role between equity incentives and corporate innovation performance.

Keywords


equity incentive; corporate performance; internal control; intermediary effec

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References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.36012/ems.v2i1.2789

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